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When deciding whether to adopt an innovative product or service, consumers often experience different levels
of anxiety that prompt them to resist purchase (e.g., fear of learning new technologies, disruption of estab-
lished habits or beliefs). In such cases, consumers’ anxiety is mitigated by “validation” through externality
(e.g., the number of early adopters). To reduce consumers’ anxiety, firms can also invest in “familiarization”
through promotion (e.g., offering free trials). We conceptualize innovation as a product that engenders anx-
iety, and present a model that employs a consumer utility model focusing on the psychological dimension.
We examine the firm’s profit-maximizing promotion and pricing decisions when selling to forward-looking
consumers in the presence of externality. Our equilibrium analysis reveals that, unlike the conventional wis-
dom for promoting new products, for anxiety-inducing innovations with externality, accelerating the speed
of adoption through promotion can actually be detrimental to the firm.
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21. Introduction
When making a purchasing decision, consumers evaluate both the functional and the psychological
benefits and costs of the product (Hellofs and Jacobson 1999).1 For purchase decisions involving
new innovative products, psychological factors play a prominent role (Castano et al. 2008). This is
because purchasing an innovative product disrupts established habits (Ram 1989, Ram and Sheth
1989), requires learning the necessary steps to use the innovation effectively, or parting from an
emotionally attached old technology (Fournier 1998, Hoeﬄer 2003, Castano et al. 2008). While
consumers with low anxiety level will likely become early adopters, those with higher anxiety levels
may delay their purchase until their anxiety level decreases (Ram and Sheth 1989). Consider the
following examples:
• Satellite TV or TV-set top boxes such as Apple TV or ROKU. These innovative products
allow consumers to watch TV and stream various programs using a single source at a lower cost
than other alternatives including cable TV.
• Contactless payment technology that was recently introduced by Transport for London. This
innovative service allows customers to tap their debit/credit cards at the turnstile gates and there-
fore eliminates the need to wait in line to purchase traditional tickets or travel cards (e.g., an
Oyster card).
• Uber or Lyft. These mobile app services allow consumers to access Taxi service within minutes
via a smart phone from arbitrary locations at a reduced cost.
Despite the seemingly superior functional benefits that these new-generation products or services
offer over existing alternatives, many consumers are still reluctant to adopt them due to various
anxieties including: “Will it work with my other products?”, “Is it secure enough?”, and “Will I
be able to use it easily?”
Consumer anxiety can hinder the adoption speed of innovations, and it is one of the determining
factors for the success/failure of new product launches (Sheth 1981, Gatignon and Robertson
1989, Ram and Sheth 1989, Castano et al. 2008, Kleijnen et al. 2009). Thus, a firm launching a
novel product must manage consumer anxiety to improve adoption speed and maximize profit. In
1 The psychological component of utility is different from models of bounded rationality, which consider consumers
with cognitive limitations or psychological biases. We do not assume consumers use simple heuristics to make complex
decisions, or display certain intrinsic psychological tendencies (Ren and Huang 2018).
3studying how a new innovation spreads in a market, the diffusion literature points to two sets of
factors which are (i) internal to consumer population such as their validation through externality,
and (ii) external to consumer population, such as firms’ promotion and pricing decisions (Bass
1969, Gatignon and Robertson 1985, Chatterjee and Eliashberg 1990, Peres et al. 2010).
This observation motivated us to develop a model that captures both the internal factor (i.e.,
validation through externality) and the external factor (i.e., familiarization through promotion)
in this paper. Specifically, consumers reduce their anxiety levels by observing other adopters. For
example, an anxious consumer who is initially reluctant to use Uber (or contactless payment or
TV top boxes) may become more comfortable adopting it after observing many other users. On
the other hand, to reduce consumers’ anxiety levels, a firm can actively help consumers familiarize
with the innovative products/services by offering free trials or training videos/seminars, allowing
easy access to products via showrooms and experience centers (Goering 1985, Heiman and Muller
1996), or presenting reassuring messages through general advertising. Naturally, consumers with
higher anxiety levels may, in anticipation of their anxiety subsiding in the future, choose to delay
their purchase.
In this paper, we conceptualize innovation as a product whose functional benefit is known but its
adoption engenders anxiety, and examine firm’s appropriate promotion and pricing decisions. We
employ a consumer utility model that focuses on psychological anxiety and present a stylized model
that captures three salient features: (i) consumers are heterogeneous in their anxiety levels, (ii)
psychological anxiety can be reduced by firm’s promotion strategy (due to familiarization effect) as
well as the number of adopters (due to externality effect), and (iii) consumers are forward-looking
(i.e., they may delay their purchase decisions to lower their anxiety or in anticipation of price
drops). The analysis of our unified framework results in closed-form equilibrium expressions, which
allow us to determine and compare the optimal firm decisions on promotion and pricing and the
resulting demand and profits in the presence or absence of externality. We offer insights not only
on the firm’s separate pricing and promotion strategies, but more interestingly, we present new
findings on how the interplay between externality and promotion impacts firm profits.
4Regarding the optimal pricing strategy, we find that decreasing the selling price over time (price
markdown) is always optimal for the firm when externality is absent. However, in the presence of
externality, increasing the selling price over time can be optimal for the firm. Lowering price in
the early period increases the number of early adopters, which reduces the remaining consumers’
anxiety and raises their valuation of the product. Thus, firms can benefit from the mark-up pricing
by capturing the late adopters at a premium price. This is consistent with penetration pricing
strategy of networked goods (Dhebar and Oren 1985).
More importantly, with regards to firms’ optimal promotion strategy, we find that in the presence
of externality, employing familiarization strategy can be, even if it is free to implement, detrimental
to the firm’s profit. That is, higher speed of consumer adoption can lead to lower profits for the
firm. Externality benefits the innovative firm because it allows the firm to reap reward from the
premium price charged to a larger group of late adopters. Employing familiarization strategy may
offset this benefit because it increases the speed of adoption and decreases the number of late
adopters.
Existing literature on new products with externalities have primarily focused on pricing (Dhebar
and Oren 1985, Xie and Sirbu 1995, Gabszewicz and Garcia 2008) and other issues such as firm
survival (Srinivasan et al. 2004, Wang et al. 2010), product strategy (Sun et al. 2004), and product
upgrade (Padmanabhan et al. 1997). In this study, moving beyond pricing as a profit lever associ-
ated with new product introduction, we identify product promotion (familiarization) as a second
important lever for innovating firms and address how firms’ promotion strategy affect their profits
in the presence of externalities.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines our externality mechanism by
classifying its type (§2.1) and clarifying its difference to social learning (§2.2). In §3, we present
our stylized model of consumer adoption model over two periods. In §4, we analyze the impact of
firm’s familiarization strategy and externality on the consumer adoption and the firm’s optimal
pricing and profit. We conclude in §5. All proofs are provided in the Appendix.
52. Externality
Externality is a key element of our model. However, there are many different types of externality
and it sometimes appears to relate to the concept of social learning. In this section, we distinguish
our externality mechanism by classifying its type (§2.1) and clarifying how it is different from social
learning (§2.2).
2.1. Types of Externality
Consumption externality describes the property that a consumer’s utility associated with the con-
sumption of a good (or service) increases with the number of other agents consuming the good.
This concept has been formalized from study of networked goods such as the telephone network
(Katz and Shapiro 1985), in which the value of consuming a networked product increases when
more users are in the network. Such externality can also manifest itself indirectly through com-
plementary products. For example, in the setting of computers, the value of a PC (as opposed to
Mac) increases when more consumers use PCs because there will be more software developed for
PCs.
This standard concept of externality has since evolved from the traditional network setting
into different subgenres of literature based on different contexts. Specifically, externalities can be
classified by a two-by-two matrix (Table 1) depending on whether (i) externality influences the
functional or psychological component of the utility, and (ii) whether there is positive or negative
consumption externality.
Functional utility Psychological utility
Positive externality
Networked goods (telephone) or
complementary products (soft-
ware/hardware)
New technology products, innova-
tions, restaurants, movies, fashion
(conformity seeking behavior)
Negative externality
Services (utilities, roads) due to
congestion
Luxury products (exclusivity seeking
behavior)
Table 1 Four types (2x2) of externality. Our externality mechanism corresponds to the upper right quadrant.
6First, “positive externality” exists for many networked goods. However, it is also present for
many non-networked products or services when an increase in the number of adopters increases
the consumers’ psychological utility by appealing to their penchant for conformity (top half of
Table 1). Becker (1991) suggests that the pleasure from a good (e.g., food from a restaurant) may
be inherently greater when more people want to consume it. Greater number of early adopters
can influence the confidence about a product (Hellofs and Jacobson 1999), creating a perception
as a standard (Brynjolfsson and Kemerer 1996), indicating fashion trends which is important for
customer subgroups who seek conformity from peers (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf 1993, Moretti
2011), or increasing reputation (Gabszewicz and Garcia 2008).
Second, “negative externality” occurs when a consumer’s utility decreases with the number of
other users (bottom half of Table 1). For example, in service operations, an increase in the number
of customers creates congestion, which decreases the functional benefit of the service (e.g., increased
waiting time, more frequent blackouts in utility). Moreover, negative consumption externality can
also occur in the psychological domain. For example, in the case of luxury markets, consumers seek
exclusivity or status when purchasing the luxury item. As such, the utility derived from purchase
decreases as the number of purchasers increases (Gao et al. 2016).
Our setting pertains to positive externality in the psychological domain (upper right quadrant of
Table 1). We consider the setting of innovative non-networked product, where a consumer’s anxiety
subsides when many others adopt the product or services. Despite its wide presence of positive
externality of general non-networked goods, its complex effects have received limited attention in
the literature (Tellis 2010). We contribute to this growing literature.
2.2. Externality vs. Social Learning
A mechanism that often appears simultaneously but is different from externality is “social learning.”
The two framework are intertwined because both mechanisms are relevant to settings where product
qualities are unknown. In this section, we clarify the difference between our externality framework
and social learning framework.
7For social learning mechanism, consumers gather (or infer) information from their peers who
have already consumed the good (e.g. via customer reviews or word-of-mouth) to update their
beliefs. As such, whether the consumer reviews are positive or negative, and how diverse they
are, have important implications on consumers’ subsequent purchase decisions. In other words,
social learning model assumes that individuals care about others’ actions only because they convey
information about the quality of a product (Banerjee 1992, Bikhchandani et al. 1998). Social
learning is therefore appropriate and primarily used for examining consumer purchase decisions
based on the functional benefit of the products.
In contrast, externality does not involve updating beliefs and information is not gathered (or
inferred). Instead, a consumer’s utility from a product depends directly on the observed number
of early adopters. In other words, in externality models, the others’ actions are relevant because
they show the number of adopters.
Despite their stark differences, the impact of social learning and externality have often been
difficult to separate both empirically (Moretti 2011) and theoretically (Peres et al. 2010). For
example, Moretti (2011) states that many of his conclusions about the impact of social learning on
movie sales can also be explained by externality. In the innovation diffusion literature (i.e., Bass
(1969) and its extensions), the impacts of interpersonal learning and externality are collapsed as a
single parameter (Goldenberg et al. 2010). In organizational theory, social learning and externality
are two competing theories that explain diffusion of innovation (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf 1993).
However, the externality and social learning effects are theoretically separable in the extreme
cases when: (i) only social learning exist – the quality of a product is unknown and there are no
externality effects, or (ii) only externality exist – the quality of a product is perfectly known to
customers in advance, and consumers can observe the number of adopters. There have been many
recent studies in the operations management and marketing disciplines investigating the former
setting — impact of social learning free from externality. These studies conceptualize innovations
as products whose quality is unknown to consumers and focus on customers’ social learning, e.g.,
8via posted reviews by early adopters (Yu et al. 2015, Papanastasiou and Savva 2016). Instead, we
study the latter setting — impact of externality without the traditional social learning, which has
received limited attention in the literature. (The combination of externality and social learning is
beyond the scope of this paper and we defer it as future research.)
In summary, our contribution to the literature is twofolds. First, we formalize an alternative con-
ceptualization of an innovation as a product whose functional benefit is known and yet consumers
have psychological anxiety about adopting it. A consumer’s anxiety is reduced as more consumers
purchase the product due to the externality effect (top right quadrant of Table 1). Second, using
the unified framework, we examine the firm’s optimal promotion and pricing strategy and how it
interacts with externality. Our equilibrium analysis reveals that, unlike the conventional wisdom
for promoting new products, for anxiety-inducing innovations with externality, accelerating the
speed of adoption through familiarization can be detrimental to the firm.
3. The Model
A firm introduces a new innovative product to the market with an functional benefit v that is
known and common to all consumers (as discussed in §§1–2). We focus on this setting with the
intention to isolate the effect of externality from (social) learning (Moretti 2011). We consider
a two-period model in which the firm seeks to maximize its profit over two periods by making
the following decisions. In period 1 (the launch period), the firm determines whether to launch a
promotion campaign to familiarize the consumers with the product, then sets the selling price p1.
In period 2 (post-launch period), after observing the realized demand in period 1, D1, the firm sets
a price p2. For ease of exposition, we scale the firm’s discount factor to 1 and production cost to 0.
In our model, all consumers are rational and determine the timing of their purchase to maximize
their expected utility. Each consumer has unit demand and consumes the product at the time of
purchase. All consumers have a common discount factor δ < 1 due to delayed consumption, and
a lower (higher) discount factor implies a more myopic (forward-looking) consumer base. (Fully
myopic consumer base is a special case of our model with δ= 0).
9A consumer’s expected utility is governed by both functional and psychological components. The
functional component consists of the value of the product v (constant over two periods) and prices p1
and p2. The psychological component pertains to consumers’ psychological anxiety about adopting
the innovation, which is represented as a psychological disutility. Consumers are heterogeneous
in their anxiety levels due to their different prior experiences or knowledge (Hoeﬄer 2003, Wang
1997). We denote consumer i’s initial level of anxiety level as xi. For simplicity, we assume that the
market comprises of a continuum of consumers with initial anxiety levels xi uniformly distributed
over [0, v], and we normalize the market size to 1 (i.e., demand is equivalent to proportion of
consumers).2
Consumer i’s anxiety level in period 1 and 2 depends on his or her initial anxiety level xi
and the two effects of familiarization (F) and externality (E). These two effects are respectively
external and internal to consumers, consistent with those that govern the speed of adoption in
the diffusion literature (Peres et al. 2010). Familiarization (F) happens when the firm invests in
a promotion campaign to alleviate consumers’ anxiety of adoption such as offering free trials,
presenting demonstrations, or general advertising. In our model, the firm can invest K at the
beginning of period 1 so that the anxiety levels are reduced by a factor α < 1 for all consumers
(from xi to α · xi) in periods 1 and 2. No investment corresponds to K = 0 and α = 1.3 We will
refer to the parameter α as the effectiveness of the firm’s familiarization effort.
Externality (E) occurs because consumers’ period 2 anxiety levels would decrease in the number
of early adopters in period 1, D1.
4 In our model, in the presence of externality, a consumer i’s
anxiety level in period 1, xi will be revised to (β/D1) ·xi in period 2, where the parameter β ∈ (0,1)
is a reference point that helps gauge whether the demand D1 is high or low. If the number of
2 Our model is easily generalizable to the case where the xi is uniformly distributed over [0,R] for any R.
3 We treat K and α as parameters for ease of analysis, but α can be a function of K in principle.
4 Although early adopters in period 1 can also be influenced by externality (e.g., Dhebar and Oren 1985), we assume
that only the late adopters in period 2 benefit from externality because it is more representative of our new product
launch setting and also consistent with many other modeling convention (e.g., Bensaid and Lesne 1996).
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adopters in period 1 is above this reference point (D1 >β), the number of adopters is deemed large
by the consumers and the anxiety level (β/D1) · xi is adjusted downward. On the other hand, if
D1 is below this reference point (D1 <β), demand is considered low by consumers and the anxiety
levels for the remaining consumers is increased. This simple adjustment rule follows the convention
of modeling externality in the diffusion literature (Goldenberg et al. 2010); it is also a special case
of Becker (1991), where a person’s demand for a good is positively related to the demand of others,
and captures the notion of positive externality that consumers are more (less) willing to enter a
restaurant when it is full (empty).
Externality is internal to consumer population and firms have limited control. The reference
point β is associated with the characteristics of the product market environment (Oliver 1980,
Thaler 1985, Hoch and Loewenstein 1991). For example, for certain fashion or high-tech products
targeted towards young consumers, relatively small number of early adopters could create a favor-
able externality effect, corresponding to the case with relatively low reference point β. However,
for some new products such as novel financial investment offerings or new drugs, it may be difficult
to achieve a favorable externality effect unless a relatively large number of early adopters have
bought into the product. In such case, consumer reference point β would be relatively high.
When both familiarization and externality are present (F+E), consumer i’s anxiety level is
reduced from xi to αxi in period 1, and in period 2 it is further revised to α(β/D1)xi. Table 2
summarizes the consumer i’s utilities for the new product in period 1 and period 2 without and with
the presence of externality. (Note that α= 1 represents the firm not investing in familiarization.)
Period 1 Period 2
F only: ui = v−αxi− p1 ui = δ(v−α ·xi− p2)
E only: ui = v−xi− p1 ui = δ(v− β
D1
·xi− p2)
F+E: ui = v−αxi− p1 ui = δ(v− αβ
D1
·xi− p2)
Table 2 Consumer i’s utilities based on initial anxiety level xi, presence of F or E, and prices p1, p2.
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Figure 1 summarizes the sequence of our model. In the beginning of period 1, the firm first
determines whether to invest K in promotion campaign (K = 0 with no investment) to familiarize
consumers and lower their anxiety by a factor α≤ 1 (with equality when no investment). It then
sets price p1. The consumers decide whether to purchase in period 1 or not by comparing their
corresponding expected utilities between purchasing now, later, or leaving the market, i.e., v−αxi−
p1 ≥max{δ(v−α(β/D1)xi− p2),0}. Because both future price p2 and anxiety level α(β/D1)xi are
not known at the time of decision in period 1, consumers form rational expectations about those
values to evaluate their utilities. At the end of period 1, demand D1 is realized, which is observed
by the firm and the remaining consumers. In period 2, the firm sets price p2 and the remaining
consumers decide to purchase the product based on their revised anxiety levels.
Figure 1 Sequence of events
Firm’s decisions: 
•  Invest in F and incur K? 
•  Set p1 
Consumer i’s anxiety 
level equals: αxi 
(under F). 
 
Demand 
D1 is 
observed 
Consumer i 
purchases if 
αxi < τ1 (under F). 
 
Firm’s decision: 
•  Set p2 
Consumer i’s “adjusted” 
anxiety level equals: αxi  
(under F), β/D1·xi (under E), or 
α·β/D1·xi (under F+E). 
Consumer i purchases 
if “adjusted” anxiety 
level < τ2 (under F, E, 
or F+E). 
time 
t=2 t=1 
Revised	version	on	04/NOV/2017
Note that consumers with lower anxiety level (below a threshold τ1) will adopt the new product
early (in period 1), while consumers with higher anxiety level will delay their decision (until period
2) and purchase in period 2 if their anxiety level is below a threshold, τ2. Such purchasing strategy
employed by consumers is consistent with Ram and Sheth (1989). The adoption rate is characterized
by the thresholds τ1 and τ2. Also, the delay in the purchase decision is driven not only from the
anticipation of a lower price, but also from the anticipation of a lower anxiety level, which depends
on both firm’s pricing decision and consumers’ rational expectation. In the rational expectation
12
equilibrium, all consumer i’s period 1 expectations about p2 and D1 coincide with the realized p2
and D1.
Our model captures the intricate dynamics between the firm and the consumers, and consumers
with each other, concerning pricing, familiarization, and externality. Despite its complexity, we will
show in the next section that the firm’s optimal prices and profit are determined in closed form
using backward induction under the rational expectation equilibrium.
4. Analysis
To examine the implications of familiarization, externality, and their interaction on the equilibrium
outcomes, we first examine independently the setting with familiarization (F) only (§4.1) and
externality (E) only (§4.2). Then, we examine the equilibrium outcomes when both mechanisms
(F+E) are present (§4.3), and examine the managerial implication of their interaction (§4.4).
4.1. Firm’s Familiarization Effort (F only)
We begin by examining the case where the firm invests K to promote familiarization of the new
product to consumers at the time of launch in period 1. Due to the familiarization effect induced
by the promotion, a consumer i’s anxiety level is reduced from xi to αxi throughout periods 1 and
2, where α< 1.
Our analysis requires understanding the complex dynamics between the firm and consumers,
and consumers forming expectation about the firm’s pricing decisions. To build intuition of our
equilibrium analysis based on backward induction, consider the case when α = 1. We begin by
analyzing consumers’ purchasing decision in period 2. Note that consumers with a lower anxiety
level xi ∈ [0, τ1] will have purchased the new product in period 1 in equilibrium (we shall determine
the equilibrium threshold τ1 later). Because xi is uniformly distributed over [0, v], the demand
in period 1 is D1 = τ1/v. Therefore, all remaining consumers in period 2 have an anxiety level
xi ∈ (τ1, v]. For any given selling price p2, a consumer remaining in period 2 will purchase the
new product if and only if the consumer’s utility ui = v− xi− p2 > 0, i.e., when the anxiety level
xi ≤ τ2 ≡ v− p2. In this case, the demand in period 2 is D2 = (τ2− τ1)/v= (v− p2− τ1)/v.
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Anticipating the demand D2 in period 2 as given above, the firm sets price p2 to maximize its
period 2 profit (pi2),
pi∗2 = max
p2
p2 ·D2(p2) = max
p2
p2 · v− p2− τ1
v
.
Taking the first-order condition with respect to p2, we obtain the following optimal price, demand,
and profit in period 2 as a function of τ1:
p∗2(τ1) =
v− τ1
2
; D∗2(τ1) =
v− τ1
2
1
v
; pi∗2(τ1) =
(
v− τ1
2
)2
1
v
.
We next examine the period 1 problem where the firm selects p1 to maximize its total profit in
both periods. First, observe that in a rational expectation equilibrium, a consumer will purchase
the new product in period 1 if and only if her surplus from purchasing in period 1 is non-negative
and is higher than the surplus from purchasing in period 2, i.e., v− xi− p1 ≥ 0 and v− xi− p1 ≥
δ(v− xi− p2). Hence, in equilibrium, a consumer with anxiety level xi = τ1 is indifferent between
purchasing in period 1 or period 2, so that v − τ1 − p1 = δ(v − τ1 − p2). By using the fact that
p∗2(τ1) =
v−τ1
2
, the equilibrium price p1 can be expressed as a function of τ1,
p1(τ1) =
(
1− δ
2
)
(v− τ1). (1)
Second, recall that the demand in period 1 is D1(p1) = τ1/v. Because the firm’s profit in period
2 is given as pi∗2(τ1) =
(
v−τ1
2
)2 1
v
, the firm’s problem for period 1 can be formulated as:
pi∗ = max
p1
p1 · τ1
v
+pi∗2(τ1)
s.t. (1) holds.
Using (1) to transform the decision variable from p1 to τ1, the firm’s problem is reformulated to
pi∗ = max
τ1≤v
{(
1− δ
2
)
(v− τ1)τ1
v
+
(
v− τ1
2
)2
1
v
}
. (2)
Because the objective function is concave in τ1, one can use the first-order condition to determine
the optimal value of τ1, which can in turn be used to retrieve the equilibrium outcomes for both
periods — p∗1, p
∗
2, D
∗
1 , and D
∗
2 — in closed form.
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This argument can be extended to the case where α < 1 by replacing xi with αxi. When α is
sufficiently small, the analysis must take into account the boundary condition that demand across
both periods is limited to 1 (D∗1 +D
∗
2 = 1), i.e., market saturation occurs (See Appendix for details).
We obtain the following results.
Proposition 1 (Familiarization only). When the firm invests K in familiarization effort to
alleviate consumer anxiety by a factor of α, the equilibrium prices (p∗1, p
∗
2), demands (D
∗
1, D
∗
2),
and total profit (pi∗) can be expressed as follows: Let αˆ(δ)≡ 2+
√
4−(3+δ) (2−δ)2
(3−2δ)
3+δ
.
1. When α≥ αˆ(δ),
p∗1 =
v
2
(2− δ)2
3− 2δ ,
D∗1 =
1
α
1− δ
3− 2δ ,
pi∗ =
v
4α
· (2− δ)
2
3− 2δ −K;
p∗2 =
v
2
2− δ
3− 2δ ,
D∗2 =
1
2α
2− δ
3− 2δ ,
2. When α< αˆ(δ),
p∗1 = v
(
1−α
(
1 + δ
2
))
,
D∗1 =
1
2
,
pi∗ =
v
4
(4−α(3 + δ))−K.
p∗2 = (1−α)v,
D∗2 =
1
2
,
Proposition 1 thus presents a comprehensive characterization of the equilibrium prices, demands,
and profit, as well as their dependence on the effectiveness of familiarization (α) and consumers’
forward-looking behavior (δ). For instance, when familiarization effect is such that the revised
anxiety levels xi is reduced moderately (α≥ αˆ(δ)), the firm does not capture the whole market (i.e.,
D∗1 +D
∗
2 < 1) and the optimal profit pi
∗ is convex and decreasing in α. When the familiarization
effect is strong so that the anxiety levels xi is reduced significantly (α< αˆ(δ)), the firm saturates
the market (i.e., D∗1 +D
∗
2 = 1) and the optimal profit pi
∗ is linearly decreasing in α.
The following Corollary examines the structural properties of the equilibrium outcomes under
familiarization.
Corollary 1 (Structural Properties of Equilibrium Outcomes (F only)).
The equilibrium outcomes exhibit the following characteristics. For any effectiveness level α,
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(i) the firm will reduce its selling price in period 2, i.e., p∗1 ≥ p∗2;
(ii) the majority of consumers will purchase in period 2, i.e., D∗1 ≤D∗2;
(iii) the firm’s profit pi∗ is decreasing in the discount factor δ, ∀α.
Corollary 1 can be interpreted as follows. First, because the level of anxiety is reduced by the
same factor α in both periods, all remaining consumers in period 2 will have relatively higher
anxiety level than the early adopters who purchased in period 1. To entice them to purchase and
generate demand in period 2, the firm has to reduce its price in period 2. In turn, a majority of
consumers do not purchase in period 1 because they anticipate that price will fall in the second
period. Only those with low anxiety levels will purchase in period 1. Finally, as the discount factor
δ increases, more consumers are willing to postpone their purchasing decision until period 2 to
purchase at a lower price, resulting in lower profit for the firm.
Figure 2 illustrates the optimal profit pi∗ with respect to α ∈ [0,1] when the promotion requires
investment of K = 2. The firm’s optimal profit is continuous and convex decreasing in α. The
profit without promotion (K = 0 and α= 1) is represented by the horizontal dotted line. Figure 2
confirms the intuition that investing in familiarization is beneficial only when, relative to cost
(K), the familiarization effect is sufficiently strong (α sufficiently low). This intuitive result is also
consistent with broad marketing literature (Lilien et al. 1992) which highlights the beneficial effects
of consumers’ familiarization with new products (e.g., offering free samples/trials, advertising) on
firms’ profits.
It is interesting to observe that familiarization alone, regardless of its effectiveness, fails to
significantly influence neither the firm’s markdown pricing strategy, i.e., p∗1 ≥ p∗2, nor the consumer
purchase behavior, i.e., D∗1 ≤D∗2. That is, regardless of the effectiveness of familiarization (α), a
majority of consumers purchase the product at a reduced price in period 2. We will see later (in
§4.3) whether this observation would be altered in the presence of externality.
4.2. Externality among Consumers (E only)
We now examine the equilibrium outcomes when only externality (E) is present. Recall that the
initial anxiety level xi of all remaining consumer i in period 2 will be adjusted to (β/D1) ·xi. Thus,
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Figure 2 The optimal firm profit with familiarization with respect to its effectiveness (α).
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
,
0
2
4
6
8
:
*
:* with F only
:* for benchmark
Note. In this plot, δ= 0.7, αˆ(δ= 0.7) = 0.6, and K = 2.
in the presence of externality, consumers may delay their purchase decisions also in anticipation of
observing high number of early adopters D1 and lowering their anxiety levels.
When taking this positive externality into consideration, the firm may want to lower its price
in period 1 to generate higher early demand, which will reduce the anxiety for those remaining
consumers in period 2. However, selling at reduced price to too many consumers is also not desirable.
For consumers, in addition to forming expectation about the firm’s pricing decisions, they must
also form expectation about other consumers’ purchase decisions to make their purchase decision
in period 1. Despite the added complexity, similar equilibrium analysis using backward induction
outlined in the previous section can be employed (to avoid repetition, see Appendix for details).
We next present the closed-form equilibrium that emerges in the presence of externality.
Proposition 2 (Externality only). When consumers adjust their anxiety level from xi to
(β/D1) · xi according to externality at the beginning of period 2, the equilibrium prices (p∗1, p∗2),
demands (D∗1, D
∗
2), and the total profit for both periods (pi
∗) can be expressed as follows: ∃βˆ(δ)
available in implicit form such that,
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Proposition 2 fully characterizes the equilibrium prices, demands, and profit, and their depen-
dence on consumers’ reference point for externality (β) and forward-looking behavior (δ). First,
suppose that the consumer reference point β is not large (β < βˆ(δ)) so that less number of early
adopters can increase the utility of the late adopters. In such case, externality effect is favorable
to the firm because the anxiety levels would be more easily adjusted downward by the remaining
consumers in period 2, leading to higher demand in period 2. In this case, the firm is able to
saturate the market, i.e., D∗1 +D
∗
2 = 1. Second, suppose that consumer reference point β is large
(β ≥ βˆ(δ)) so that only a large number of early adopters would increase the utility of the late
adopters. In such case, the externality effect is unfavorable to the firm because the anxiety levels
of the remaining consumers would be less easily adjusted downwards. As a result, the firm does
not capture the whole market, and D∗1 +D
∗
2 < 1.
The following corollary examines the structural properties of the equilibrium outcomes and the
impact of externality.
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Corollary 2 (Structural Properties of Equilibrium Outcomes (E only)).
In the presence of externality where consumers adjust their anxiety level from xi to (β/D1) · xi at
the beginning of period 2,
(i) the firm employs a markup pricing (p∗1 < p
∗
2) when β is lower and a markdown pricing (p
∗
1 ≥ p∗2)
when β is higher;
(ii) the equilibrium demands are so that D∗1 <D
∗
2 when β is lower and D
∗
1 ≥D∗2 when β is higher.
(iii) the firm’s profit pi∗ is decreasing in the discount factor δ, ∀β;
When consumer reference level β is lower (i.e., when the externality effect is favorable), mark-up
pricing is optimal (i.e., p∗1 < p
∗
2). A low initial price p1 will generate sufficient demand in period
1 (i.e., D1) that would reduce the anxiety of the remaining consumers in period 2. As a result,
consumers in period 2 would have higher utility for the product, and the firm can afford to charge
a higher premium price in period 2. Interestingly, a majority of consumers will choose to delay
purchase, despite the lower price in period 1, because they anticipate a lower anxiety level in period
2. This result elucidates why favorable externality can significantly benefit firm’s profit: it allows
the firm to charge a premium price to a majority of consumers in period 2.
When consumer reference level β is higher, however, mark-down pricing is optimal (i.e., p∗1 > p
∗
2).
To generate a favorable (or at least avoid unfavorable) externality effect, the firm must set a
sufficiently low price in period 1 to generate a high enough demand D1. The decrease in profit in
period 1 however, is not warranted given that there will be less remaining consumers in period 2 to
profit from. At the same time, a majority of consumers choose to purchase early in period 1 despite
the lower price in period 2. This is because the extent of the mark-down is not significant and they
anticipate the anxiety level to not go down significantly and do not want to delay consumption.
Finally, the firm’s profit decreases when consumers are forward looking (higher δ). As consumers
become more forward looking (δ increases), they are more prone to wait, thus lowering period 1
demand. In the presence of externality, reduction of period 1 demand also has an unfavorable effect
for the firm’s period 2 demand. In other words, consumers’ forward-looking behavior lowers demand
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(and prices) in both periods 1 and 2 and hurts the firm. It is interesting to observe that unlike effect
of familiarization, presence of externality does fundamentally influence the firm’s pricing strategy
and consumer adoption behavior in equilibrium.
These results with forward-looking consumers are consistent with previous studies which investi-
gate dynamic pricing with externality (Dhebar and Oren 1985, Bensaid and Lesne 1996). The firm
may implement mark-down or mark-up pricing depending on the intensity of the externality effect.
Namely, if the externality effect is strong enough, the firm adopts mark-up pricing, otherwise, it
adopts mark-down pricing (Bensaid and Lesne 1996).
Figure 3 plots the optimal profit in the presence of externality with respect to the consumer
reference level β ∈ (0,1). The optimal firm profit pi∗ is continuous and convex in β, but no longer
monotonic. The profit with no externality (and no familiarization effort by the firm, K = 0 and
α= 1) is illustrated again by the horizontal dotted line. As discussed, we observe that externality
is beneficial when the consumer reference level β is lower (favorable), and detrimental when it is
higher (unfavorable).
Figure 3 The optimal firm profit in the presence of externality with respect to consumer reference point β.
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Note. In this plot, δ= 0.7 and βˆ(δ= 0.7) = 0.42.
Given that an effective familiarization effort (lower α) or the presence of favorable externality
(lower β) each benefits the firm independently, it may appear that employing a familiarization
20
campaign in the presence of externality can only benefit the firm. We shall show that this intuition
is not necessarily true in the next section.
4.3. Combined Effect of Familiarization and Externality (F+E)
In this section, we examine the equilibrium outcomes when both anxiety-mitigating mechanisms
of familiarization (F) and externality (E) are present. In this setting, recall that the anxiety level
of consumer i is reduced from xi to αxi in period 1 due to firm’s familiarization effort, and then
from αxi to α(β/D1) ·xi in period 2 due to externality. Using the same equilibrium analysis of the
previous section, we establish the following closed form equilibrium results.
Proposition 3 (Familiarization and Externality). When the firm invests K in familiar-
ization effort and externality is present among consumers, the equilibrium prices (p∗1, p
∗
2), demands
(D∗1, D
∗
2) and total profit (pi
∗) can be expressed as follows: ∃βˆ(α, δ) available in an implicit form
such that,
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(b) If α< δ
2−δβ , then
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1− δ(1−αβ)
2
− 2α
2β
1 +αβ
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,
D∗1 = 1,
pi∗ = v
(
1− δ(1−αβ)
2
− 2α
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1− 2α
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D∗2 = 0,
Proposition 3 fully characterizes the equilibrium outcomes and their dependence on familiariza-
tion effectiveness (α), reference point for externality (β), and consumers’ forward-looking behavior
(δ). Figure 4 represents the three parts of Proposition 3 in (α,β) ∈ [0,1] × [0,1] delineated by
thresholds βˆ(α, δ) (solid curve) and δ
2−δβ (dotted curve) for δ= 0.7 (left panel) and δ= 0.95 (right
panel). Unlike δ
2−δβ , observe that the implicit threshold βˆ(α, δ) is robust to the changes in δ.
Figure 4 Thresholds separating three regions in the (α,β) space for δ= 0.7 (left panel) and δ= 0.95 (right panel).
1: D1*+D2*<1
2(b): D1*=1
2(a): D1*+D2*=1
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Note. The solid curve represents βˆ(α, δ) and the dotted curve represents α= δ
2−δβ .
The first part shows that if firm’s familiarization effort has moderate effect (higher α) and
the externality is unfavorable to the firm (higher β), the firm does not saturate the market and
D∗1 +D
∗
2 < 1. Otherwise, the firm captures the whole market (i.e., D
∗
1 +D
∗
2 = 1), consistent with
both Propositions 1–2. Unlike Propositions 1–2 however, it is possible for the firm to accelerate
adoption to saturate the whole market in period 1 (i.e., D∗1 = 1) and it may be optimal to do so
when familiarization is sufficiently effective (α< δ/(2−δβ)). This threshold on α is sensitive to the
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consumers’ forward looking behavior (δ). Recall that consumers’ forward-looking behavior hurts
the firm’s period 2 demand as well as period 1 in the presence of externality. Indeed, as consumers
become more forward-looking (high δ), the threshold shifts towards the right (left panel vs right
panel of Figure 4) and it becomes optimal for the firm to sell out in the first period to block out
the unfavorable effect of externality for less effective familiarization level α.
The following results reveal the structural properties of equilibrium outcomes and how familiar-
ization and externality interact to influence them.
Corollary 3 (Structural Properties of Equilibrium Outcomes (F+E)). Consider the
case when the firm invests K to induce the familiarization effect in the presence of externality.
(i) For any β, as α decreases, p∗1 decreases and p
∗
2 increases, shifting the optimal pricing from mark
down towards mark up pricing;
(ii) For any β, as α decreases, demands in both periods D∗1 and D
∗
2 increase in region 1; D
∗
1
increases to 1 and D∗2 decreases to 0 in region 2; and remain unchanged at D
∗
1 = 1 and D
∗
2 = 0 in
region 3;
(iii) The firm’s profit pi∗ is decreasing in the discount factor δ, ∀α,β.
The first part of Corollary 3 shows that, unlike the setting without externality (§4.1), the effec-
tiveness of familiarization (α) does influence equilibrium prices. Namely, more effective familiariza-
tion campaign decreases the optimal period 1 price (p∗1) and increases the optimal period 2 price
(p∗2), thereby reducing the extent of the markdown. Furthermore, depending on the favorability of
externality β, it could fundamentally shift the firm’s pricing strategy from mark-down pricing to
mark-up pricing.
The second part of Corollary 3 reveals that increasing the effectiveness of familiarization cam-
paign has the effect of shifting demand from period 2 to period 1. As α decreases further, all
consumers purchase in period 1 (region 2(b) in Figure 4), at which point a further decrease in
α has no effect on the demand. Finally, as expected, consumers’ forward looking behavior hurts
firm’s profit.
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Figure 5 illustrates the firm’s optimal profit pi∗ with respect to (α,β)∈ [0,1]× [0,1] via contour
curves for δ= 0.7 (left panel) and δ= 0.95 (right panel). In both panels, as expected, profit is lowest
when familiarization is not effective and externality is unfavorable (high α and β). Surprisingly,
profit is not the highest when familiarization is effective and externality is favorable (low α and
low β). Instead, we observe two local peaks: (i) when familiarization is effective and externality
is unfavorable (low α and high β) and (ii) when familiarization is not effective and externality is
favorable (high α and low β).
Figure 5 Optimal profit pi∗ represented by contour plots in (α,β)∈ [0,1]× [0,1] for δ= 0.7 (left panel) and δ= 0.95
(right panel).
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Note. Profit is lowest when familiarization is not effective and externality is unfavorable (high α and β), but profit
is not the highest when familiarization is effective and externality is favorable (low α and β). Instead, two local peaks
exist when (i) familiarization is not effective and externality is favorable (high α and low β) or (ii) familiarization is
effective and externality is unfavorable (low α and high β).
This can be explained as follows. First, when the effect of externality is unfavorable (higher β),
more effective familiarization (smaller α) increases firm profit because it helps ensure that sufficient
period 1 demand is generated, thus helping the firm negate the unfavorable effect of externality. On
the other hand, when the effect of externality is favorable (lower β), more effective familiarization
(smaller α) decreases firm profit. Recall from Corollary 2 that favorable externality (low β) benefits
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the firm because it enables firms to charge a premium price in period 2 (via markup pricing) to a
large majority of consumers. As familiarization becomes more effective, it shifts the demand from
period 2 to period 1 (Corollary 3-(ii)), negating the beneficial effect of externality.
Thus far, we have presented insights into how the complex interaction between familiarization
and externality influences firm profits. In the next section, we examine the managerial implications.
4.4. Managerial Implications of Interaction between Familiarization and Externality
To examine the implication of the interaction between familiarization (F) and externality (E) on
the firm’s decision to invest in a familiarization campaign, we compare the optimal firm profit with
both familiarization and externality (pi∗(F + E)) to that with externality only (pi∗(E)). Taking
advantage of the closed form expressions of equilibrium profits in Propositions 2–3, we are able
to examine the values of (α,β) and δ for which pi∗(F + E) > pi∗(E). Figure 6 comprehensively
characterizes the region in the (α,β) space where additional familiarization in the presence of
externality helps or hurts firm profit, for δ= 0.7 (left panel) and δ= 0.95 (right panel).
Figure 6 Plots of regions where additional familiarization in the presence of externality helps or hurts firm profit
pi∗ for δ= 0.7 (left panel) and δ= 0.95 (right panel), for K = 2.
Additional F
is beneficial
Additional F
is detrimental
Additional F
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Additional F
is detrimental
First, we observe in both panels displayed in Figure 6 that additional familiarization campaign is
beneficial in the region with unfavorable externality (high consumer reference point β) and effective
familiarization (low α). When β is high, running a familiarization campaign that is less effective
(high α) is not recommended because the incremental benefits from increased demand outweighs
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the incremental cost K of running the promotion campaign. This is intuitive, and is also consistent
with the result when externality is not present (§4.1), where we showed that familiarization is
beneficial only when it is sufficiently effective (α) relative to cost (K).
Interestingly, we find that in the presence of favorable externality (low consumer reference point
β), even running a highly effective familiarization campaign is detrimental to the firm. This is true
even when familiarization effort is costless, i.e., when K = 0.5 Why would additional familiarization
effort exerted by the firm ever backfire when externality effect is favorable? Recall that externality
is favorable to the firm when β is lower because it enables the firm to charge a premium price in
period 2 to a large number of eager-to-purchase late adopters (Corollary 2). When familiarization
is introduced, it accelerates the adoption (shifts demand from period 2 to period 1), and saturates
the market too early (i.e., in period 1). As such, accelerated adoption may increase the profit in
the short term (period 1), but it is not profitable over the long term (periods 1 and 2) because it
limits the firm’s ability to capture the higher profit from a larger group of late adopters generated
from externality.
Second, comparing the two panels as shown in Figure 6, we observe that the region in which the
additional familiarization is beneficial decreases as the consumers become more forward-looking
(i.e., when δ is larger). That is, running promotion campaign is more attractive to the firm if the
consumer base is more myopic (i.e., when δ is smaller), and less attractive if it is more forward-
looking (i.e., when δ is larger). Familiarization is beneficial because it helps accelerate adoption
(shifts demand from period 2 to period 1) which enables firms to either take advantage of, or avoid
unfavorable effect of, externality. When consumers are more forward looking, they are inherently
disposed to delay adoption, thus making familiarization less effective.
5. Summary and Discussion
While existing literature focuses on the issue of social learning by examining the case when con-
sumers are unsure about the value of a new innovative product, we consider the case where con-
sumers are reluctant to make a purchase because they experience psychological anxiety of adoption
5 When K = 0, the two regions will be delineated by a curve resembling a horizontal line around β = 0.2. Thus when
β is low, the detrimental effect of familiarization holds for all values of α even when K = 0.
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associated with disrupting established routine or habit, learning the necessary steps to use the
innovation effectively, or parting from an emotionally attached old technology. Such anxiety can
be mitigated by the firm’s effort to help consumers to become familiarized with the product and
by the number of early adopters, i.e., externality. We investigated how these two effects interact
and examined how they affect the firm’s optimal promotion and pricing strategies.
Although pricing is an important lever to maximize profits associated with new product launches
in the presence of externality, and such optimal pricing policies have been studied in the literature
(Dhebar and Oren 1985, Xie and Sirbu 1995), a similarly important lever for anxiety-inducing
new products is a firm’s familiarization strategy, which has received relatively little attention in
the externality literature. As an initial attempt to examine the role of consumers’ psychological
anxieties and their impact on a firm’s decisions, we have developed a parsimonious modeling
framework. Our equilibrium analysis reveals that, unlike the conventional wisdom for promoting
new products, for anxiety-inducing innovations with externality, accelerating the speed of adoption
through promotion can be detrimental to the firm.
Furthermore, our closed-form expressions offer clear insights into when and why familiarization
and/or externality is beneficial and leads to some rule-of-thumb recommendations for firm’s pricing
and promotion strategies, as summarized in Table 3. We find that, (i) when externality is absent,
price mark-down is always optimal, however, price mark-up is optimal when externality is present
and is more favorable; (ii) firm should carefully devise its promotion campaign because it can be
detrimental when externality is present and favorable. Overall, this paper highlights the importance
of studying the interaction of the externality and familiarization effect.
Various extensions to our model are possible. Our model currently assumes that consumers
discount future consumption but the firm does not (or equivalently up to a scalar multiple, that
consumers discount future more heavily than the firm). If the firm discounts future more heavily
than the consumers, which may be relevant in an entrepreneurial setting, the firm may always
benefit from accelerated adoption. It may be interesting to understand the implication of the firm’s
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Externality
Effectiveness of Familiarization Campaign
Less Effective (low α) More Effective (high α)
Not present
Invest in Familiarization Don’t Invest in Familiarization
Price mark down Price mark down
Present Invest in Familiarization Don’t Invest in Familiarization
(unfavorable (high β)) Price mark up Price mark down
Present Don’t Invest in Familiarization Don’t Invest in Familiarization
(favorable (low β)) Price mark up Price mark up
Table 3 Rule-of-Thumb Recommendation for Firm’s Promotion and Pricing Strategy.
discount factor on their promotion and pricing strategy. Externalities can also be negative, for
example when consumers seek exclusivity or status-seeking behavior (Gao et al. 2016). As such,
an interesting future work may be to examine a product launch setting that engenders negative
externality. Moreover, how should firms make decisions when the anxiety-alleviating effects α and β
are uncertain, or how the results might change when the distribution of the anxiety level xi is altered
(Johnson and Myatt 2006) can also be interesting future enquiries. It is our hope that this paper
will stimulate researchers to further explore consumer psychological externality and its impact on
firms’ operational decisions and strategies. We also believe that there are numerous opportunities
to examine the issue of consumer psychological externalities via behavioral experiments.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Using backward induction, we will (i) solve for period 2, (ii) state the condi-
tion for the rational expectation equilibrium (REE), and (iii) solve for period 1 under the REE.
(i) In period 2, the period 1 demand D1 (i.e., τ1) has been realized, so τ1 is treated as a constant. The
remaining consumers in period 2 are those who did not purchase in period 1, i.e., xi > τ1. Given the anxiety
reduction α and price p2, a consumer i with anxiety level xi will purchase the product if and only if:
v−αxi− p2 > 0 ⇔ xi < v− p2
α
, τ2.
Because the consumer pool anxiety levels xi ∈ [0, v], the period 2 demand curve and the resulting profit
function are:
D2(p2|τ1) = (min{τ2, v}− τ1)1
v
= min
{
v− p2
α
− τ1, v− τ1
}
1
v
,
pi2(p2|τ1) = p2 ·min
{
v− p2
α
− τ1, v− τ1
}
1
v
= min

( v
α
− τ1
)
p2− p
2
2
α︸ ︷︷ ︸
(a)
, (v− τ1)p2︸ ︷︷ ︸
(b)

1
v
.
Figure A1 Two possible shapes for the period 2 profit function pi2(p2).
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Note. The solid line represents the period 2 profit function. In the left panel, profit pi2 is maximized by the price that
maximizes the quadratic function (a). In the right panel, profit pi2 is maximized by the price at which the quadratic
function (a) and the linear function (b) intersect.
As illustrated in Figure A1, the profit maximizing price p∗2 is either the price that maximizes the quadratic
function (a), p
(a)
2 ≡ v2 − α2 τ1 (left panel), or the price at which the quadratic function (a) and the linear
function (b) intersect, p
(b)
2 ≡ (1−α)v (right panel).
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Note that if p
(a)
2 > p
(b)
2 (left panel), then p
∗
2 = p
(a)
2 and pi
∗
2 equals the expression (a) evaluated at p
(a)
2 ; and
if p
(a)
2 ≤ p(b)2 , then p∗2 = p(b)2 and pi∗2 equals the expression (b) evaluated at p2 = p(b)2 . Since p(a)2 > p(b)2 ⇔ τ1 ≤(
2− 1
α
)
v, p∗2(τ1) and pi
∗
2(τ1)≡ pi2(p∗2(τ1)|τ1) can be expressed explicitly in terms of τ1 as:
p∗2(τ1) =

v
2
− α
2
τ1, τ1 ≤
(
2− 1
α
)
v,
(1−α)v, τ1 >
(
2− 1
α
)
v,
; pi∗2(τ1) =

1
vα
(
v
2
− α
2
τ1
)2
, τ1 ≤
(
2− 1
α
)
v
(1−α)(v− τ1), τ1 >
(
2− 1
α
)
v
. (A-1)
(ii) Under the REE, a consumer with anxiety level xi would have purchased in period 1 if and only if
v − αxi − p1 > δ(v − αxi − p∗2(τ1)), where p∗2(τ1) is given by (A-1). Thus, in the REE, the threshold τ1 is
related to p1 as follows:
v−ατ1− p1 = δ(v−ατ1− p∗2(τ1)) ⇔ p∗1 =

(
1− δ
2
)
v− (1− δ
2
)
ατ1, τ1 ≤
(
2− 1
α
)
v
v(1− δα)− (1− δ)ατ1, τ1 >
(
2− 1
α
)
v
. (A-2)
This is illustrated in Figure A2.
Figure A2 The rational expectation equilibrium under F.
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Note. In the REE, p1 and τ1 are related by a piece-wise linear curve. The inflection point τ1 =
(
2− 1
α
)
v (0.58 in
this plot) depends on α. As α decreases, the inflection point shifts left, and it disappears when α≤ 0.5.
(iii) We now examine the firm’s pricing decision in period 1, expressed as follows:
max
p1
p1τ1
1
v
+pi∗2(τ1),
s.t. (A− 2) holds.
This is equivalent to the following maximization problem with respect to τ1, which consists of two subprob-
lems based on regions of τ1: (a) τ1 ≤
(
2− 1
α
)
v and (b) τ1 >
(
2− 1
α
)
v.
pi∗ = max
{
max
τ1≤(2− 1α )v
pi(a)(τ1),
[(
1− δ
2
)
v−
(
1− δ
2
)
ατ1
]
τ1
1
v
+
1
vα
(v
2
− α
2
τ1
)2
,
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max
τ1>(2− 1α )v
pi(b)(τ1), [v(1− δα)− (1− δ)ατ1] τ1 1
v
+ (1−α)(v− τ1)
}
.
Because p∗1(τ1) is continuous in τ1 and both pi
(a) and pi(b) are quadratic in τ1, we need not consider the corner
solution of τ1 =
(
2− 1
α
)
v separately. Taking the first-order conditions of pi(a) and pi(b) and performing alge-
braic simplifications, we have the following optimal thresholds τ
(a)∗
1 and τ
(b)∗
1 and profits pi
(a)∗ = pi(a)(τ (a)∗1 )
and pi(b)∗ = pi(b)(τ (b)∗1 ):
τ
(a)∗
1 =
1− δ
α(3− 2δ)v, pi
(a)∗ =
v
4α
· (2− δ)
2
3− 2δ −K,
τ
(b)∗
1 =
v
2
, pi(b)∗ =
v
4
(4−α(3 + δ))−K.
Note that pi(a)∗ > pi(b)∗ if and only if α > αˆ ,
2+
√
4−(3+δ) (2−δ)2
(3−2δ)
3+δ
. Thus, if α > αˆ, the expressions for the
equilibrium prices (p∗1, p
∗
2), demands (D
∗
1, D
∗
2), and profits (pi
∗
1, pi
∗
2, pi
∗) can be found by substituting τ (a)∗1 =
1−δ
α(3−2δ)v into the relevant expressions. Otherwise, they can be found by substituting τ
(b)∗
1 =
v
2
. 
Proof of Propositions 2—3. To avoid repetition, we focus on the proof of Proposition 3, which
includes the proof of Proposition 2 as a special case with α= 1. Using backward induction, we will (i) solve
for period 2, (ii) identify the condition for the rational expectation equilibrium (REE), and (iii) solve for
period 1 under the REE.
(i) In period 2, the period 1 demand D1 (i.e., τ1) is realized, so τ1 is treated as a constant. PE, which
depends on D1, has reduced the consumer anxiety level by a factor of (β/D1) = (βv/τ1). Given that the
familiarization effect α has taken effect and the period 2 price is p2, a consumer with anxiety level xi will
purchase in period 2 if and only if:
v−α
(
β
D1
)
xi− p2 > 0 ⇔ xi < (v− p2) τ1
αβv
, τ2.
Here, for period 2, we consider the case where D1 < 1 (τ1 < v). For the case D1 = 1 that has no period 2
problem, which is only possible when α< 1, go to the period 1 problem in part (iii).
Because we consider a pool of consumers whose anxiety level xi ∈ [0, v], the period 2 demand curve and
the resulting profit function are:
D2(p2|τ1) = (min{τ2, v}− τ1) 1
v
= min
{
τ1
αβ
− τ1− τ1
vαβ
p2, v− τ1
}
1
v
,
pi2(p2|τ1) = p2D2(p2|τ1) = min

(
1
αβ
− 1
)
τ1p2− τ1
vαβ
p22︸ ︷︷ ︸
(a)
, p2(v− τ1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(b)
 1v .
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As illustrated in Figure A1, the profit maximizing price p∗2 is either the price that maximizes the quadratic
function (a), p
(a)
2 =
v(1−αβ)
2
(left panel), or the price at which the quadratic function (a) and the linear
function (b) intersect, p
(b)
2 = v− αβv
2
τ1
(right panel).
Note that if p
(a)
2 > p
(b)
2 (left panel), then p
∗
2 = p
(a)
2 and the optimal pi
∗
2 equals the expression (a) evaluated
at p
(a)
2 ; otherwise, p
∗
2 = p
(b)
2 and pi
∗
2 equals the expression (b) evaluated at p
(b)
2 . Since p
(a)
2 > p
(b)
2 ⇔ τ1 ≤ 2αβv1+αβ ,
p∗2(τ1) and pi
∗
2(τ1)≡ pi2(p∗2(τ1)|τ1) can be expressed explicitly in terms of τ1 as:
p∗2(τ1) =

v
2
(1−αβ), τ1 ≤ 2αβv1+αβ ,
v
(
1− αβv
τ1
)
, τ1 >
2αβv
1+αβ
.
pi∗2(τ1) =

1
4
(1−αβ)2
αβ
τ1, τ1 ≤ 2αβv1+αβ(
(1 +αβ)v− αβv2
τ1
− τ1
)
, τ1 >
2αβv
1+αβ
. (A-3)
(ii) Under the REE, consumer i with anxiety level xi will purchase in period 1 if and only if v−αxi−p1 >
δ
(
v−xiαβ vτ1 − p∗2(τ1)
)
, where p2(τ1) is given by (A-3). Solving for τ , the threshold τ1 and p1 under the
REE are related as follows:
v−ατ1− p1 = δ
(
v− τ1αβ v
τ1
− p2
)
⇔ p1 =

v
(
1− δ
2
(1−αβ))−ατ1, τ1 ≤ 2αβv1+αβ
v(1 + δαβ)− δαβv2
τ1
−ατ1, τ1 > 2αβv1+αβ .
(A-4)
This expression, however, is not well-defined because there are two τ1 at which v
(
1− δ
2
(1−αβ))− ατ1 =
v(1+ δαβ)− δαβv2
τ1
−ατ1, namely, τ1 = 2αβv1+αβ and τ1 = vδ(1+αβ)2α . To ensure that the REE relationship between
p∗1 and τ1 is well-defined, the region τ1 ∈
[
2αβv
1+αβ
, vδ(1+αβ)
2α
]
must be accounted for to be a one-to-one mapping.
This leads to the following REE condition, which is illustrated in Figure A3:
p1 =

v
(
1− δ
2
(1−αβ))−ατ1, τ1 < 2αβv1+αβ
v(1 + δαβ)− δαβv2
τ1
−ατ1, τ1 ≥ vδ(1+αβ)2α .
(A-5)
Note the two different scenarios depending on the value of δ(1+αβ)
2α
. If vδ(1+αβ)
2α
< v (left panel), which is
always true for the E-only case (α = 1), then the REE occurs in two disjoint ranges of τ1, τ1 <
2αβv
1+αβ
and
τ1 ≥ vδ(1+αβ)2α , as in (A-5). If vδ(1+αβ)2α ≥ v (right panel), the REE occurs in either the continuous range of
τ1 <
2αβv
1+αβ
or τ1 = 1. For this case, the REE expression (A-5) is updated to
p1 =

v
(
1− δ
2
(1−αβ))−ατ1, τ1 < 2αβv1+αβ
v
(
1− δ
2
(1−αβ)− 2α2β
1+αβ
)
, τ1 = v.
(A-6)
(iii) We now examine the firms pricing decision in period 1. If δ(1+αβ)
2α
≤ 1, which is always true for the
E-only case (Proposition 2), we have
max
p1
p1τ1
1
v
+pi∗2(τ1)
s.t. (A− 5) holds,
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Figure A3 The formation of the rational expectation equilibrium under F + E.
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Note. In the REE, p1 and τ1 are related by two disjoint curves defined by two inflection points, τ1 =
2αβv
1+αβ
and
τ1 =
vδ(1+αβ)
2α
. If δ(1+αβ)
2α
< 1 (left panel), the second inflection point is within the range [0, v]. If δ(1+αβ)
2α
> 1 (right
panel), the second inflection point is outside the range [0, v]. Parameters: v = 1, δ = 0.9, β = 0.3, α = 0.8 (for left
panel) and α= 0.4 (for right panel).
which can be solved by maximizing over τ1, i.e.,
pi∗ = max
{
max
τ1≤ 2αβv1+αβ
pi(a) ,
[
v
(
1− δ
2
(1−αβ)
)
−ατ1
]
τ1
1
v
+
1
4
(1−αβ)2
αβ
τ1 ,
max
τ1>
vδ(1+αβ)
2α
pi(b) ,
[
v(1 + δαβ)− δαβv
2
τ1
−ατ1
]
τ1
1
v
+
[
(1 +αβ)v− αβv
2
τ1
− τ1
]}
.
Otherwise, if δ(1+αβ)
2α
> 1, we have
max
p1
p1τ1
1
v
+pi∗2(τ1),
s.t. (A− 6) holds,
which can be solved by maximizing over τ1, i.e.,
pi∗ = max
{
max
τ1≤ 2αβv1+αβ
pi(a) ,
[
v
(
1− δ
2
(1−αβ)
)
−ατ1
]
τ1
1
v
+
1
4
(1−αβ)2
αβ
τ1 ,
pi(c) , v
(
1− δ
2
(1−αβ)− 2α
2β
1 +αβ
)}
.
We next solve pi(a) and pi(b). First, since the function pi(a) is quadratic in terms of τ1, we can find τ
(a)∗
1 and
pi(a)∗ ≡ pi(a)(τ (a)∗1 ) by taking the first-order conditions. We have:
τ
(a)∗
1 =
v
2α
(
1− δ
2
(1−αβ)
)
+
v
2α
(1−αβ)2
4αβ
, pi(a)∗ =
v
4α
(
1− δ
2
+
(
2δ+ 1
4
)
αβ+
1
4αβ
)2
.
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Next, note that the function pi(b) is not quadratic due to the τ−1 term but is nonetheless unimodal in
terms of τ1. Again taking the first-order condition of the expression, we have:
(1 + δαβ)− 2ατ1 1
v
+
v2αβ
τ21
− 1 = 0 ⇔ τ31 −
δβv
2
τ21 −
v3
2
β = 0.
We thus have a cubic function with a unique root, which can be found through the cubic equation. So taking
into account the corner solution, we have:
τ
(b)∗
1 = max
min
{
vδ(1 +αβ)
2α
,v
}
, v

(δβ
6
)3
+
β
4
+
√
β
2
(
δβ
6
)3
+
(
β
4
)2 13
+
(δβ
6
)3
+
β
4
−
√
β
2
(
δβ
6
)3
+
(
β
4
)2 13 + δβ
6

 .
Substituting the expression for thresholds τ
(b)∗
1 , we obtain the maximizing profit pi
(b)∗ ≡ pi(b)(τ (b)∗1 ).
For the region where δ(1+αβ)
2α
≤ 1, if pi(a) >pi(b), then pi∗ = pi(a) and the optimal prices and demands follow
those of problem (a); otherwise, pi∗ = pi(b) and the optimal prices and demands follow those of problem (b).
For the region where δ(1+αβ)
2α
> 1, if pi(a) > pi(c), then pi∗ = pi(a) and the optimal prices and demands follow
those of problem (a); otherwise pi∗ = pi(c) and the optimal prices and demands follow those of problem (c).
Comparing the closed-form expressions of pi(a), pi(b), and pi(c), we can simplify the above and show that there
exists an implicitly defined unique crossing point βˆ(α, δ) where (a) dominates iff β > βˆ(α, δ); (b) dominates
iff β < βˆ(α, δ) and α≥ δ
2−δβ ; and (c) dominates otherwise. 
Proof of Corollaries 1 — 3. The results follow directly from the respective closed-form expressions
of Propositions 1 —3. 
